What factors should be considered in determining the length of reasonable notice?

Cabott v. Urban Systems Ltd., 2016 YKCA 4

andrew-montgomery-lg

It goes without saying that determining what length of notice is “reasonable” in circumstances of dismissal without cause, is not a precise science and it is very much dependent on the specific facts of each particular case.  But what factors are appropriate to be considered by the employer?  The answer to that question is the important message to be taken from Cabott vs. Urban Systems Ltd., a recent decision of the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal.

Cabott was employed in a senior professional position with Urban Systems Ltd, having commenced her employment in Whitehorse on or about April 3, 2013.  She was dismissed without cause on or about May 27, 2014, only 14 months after she was hired.  Urban Systems gave Cabott two weeks pay as required under the Territory’s labour legislation and an additional 12 weeks of pay in lieu of notice.  Cabott sued for wrongful dismissal arguing the company failed to provide her with reasonable notice.

At trial, the judge referred to the so-called Bardal factors in his determination of reasonable notice.  The Bardal factors have been the foundation for the court’s determination of reasonable notice since 1960 and were originally enunciated in the Ontario High Court case Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140.  Included in the Bardal factors are such considerations as: the character of the employment, the length of service, the age of the employee and the availability of similar employment, having regard to the employee’s experience, training, and qualifications.  What is important to recognize is that all of the Bardal factors arise from within the context of the employment relationship and within the context of the contract of employment. 

In fixing the appropriate length of reasonable notice in Cabott the trial judge referred to the various Bardal factors and then continued on to say: “However, when one considers also the plaintiff’s age of 53 years…. the  expectation of secure employment and possible transition of work and retirement to Vancouver…. I conclude an appropriate period of notice in this case is six months”.

Urban Systems Ltd. appealed the trial judge’s decision arguing the award of six months notice was excessive and should be reduced. The court of appeal carefully reviewed the wealth of case law dealing with reasonable notice and made a number of observations.  First, the court stated that five months notice was at the very high end of the range of reasonable notice in cases similarly situated to Cabott v. Urban Systems Ltd.  The trial judge in Cabott awarded six month’s pay in lieu of notice,  one full month beyond what the appeal court determined was the very high end of the range.  Secondly,the court determined, upon reviewing the British Columbia jurisprudence on reasonable notice, that an average notice period of two to three months was more appropriate for cases similar to Cabott.

In Cabott, the appeal court found that, absent special circumstances, the notice  Cabott was entitled to, based on the Bardal factors, was in the vicinity of three months.  At trial, however, the trial judge referred to Cabott’s “expectation of secure employment and the possible eventual transition of work and retirement to Vancouver” as additional factors to be considered in fixing what the length of reasonable notice should be.  In other words, the trial judge treated these factors as special circumstances justifying an increase in the notice period to six months.

The court of appeal found that the trial judge erred in considering the additional factors of secure employment and transition of work and retirement to Vancouver in determining the appropriate length of notice.  These additional factors were not part of the contract of employment. Had they been intended to be part of the contract, they would have had to have been explicitly referred to in the contract.  As the court put it, the unilateral life plan of the employee cannot be considered a special circumstance justifying an increase in the length of reasonable notice. The court of appeal reduced the notice period from six months to four months.

The takeaway from Cabott for employers and employees is that the length of reasonable notice continues to be based essentially on the Bardal factors or some version of the Bardal factors.  Factors that are outside the employment contact, as important as they may be to the employee, are not a consideration in fixing the length of reasonable notice.

 

Implied Terms in a Dependent Contractor Relationship

Keenan v. Canac Kitchens Ltd., 2016 ONCA 79 (CanLII)

IMG_0468
Client focused and affordable

In a recent post, we looked at the question of whether a worker was an employee,  a contractor, or something in between, and why the answer to that question might be important.

Another recent Ontario Court of Appeal case, Keenan v. Canac Kitchens, has provided an opportunity for the court to comment further on the nature of the exclusivity factor required to establish an dependent contractor relationship.  In addition, the court in Keenan elaborated on how the length of notice for termination of a dependent contractor relationship should be determined.

In Keenan, a husband and wife (the “Keenans”) had been in the employ of Canac Kitchens since 1976 and 1983 respectively.  At the time of Mrs. Keenan’s employment by Canac in 1983, both of the Keenans worked as foremen for the company.  It was common ground that until October of 1987, the Keenans were employees of Canac and the company deducted and remitted Income Tax, EI and  CPP on behalf of all its employees, as required by law.

In 1987, Canac advised the Keenans that the working relationship between the company and the Keenans was to be changed.  The Keenans would no longer be employees of Canac, but would continue on as contractors.  As evidence of the change, the Keenans received Records of Employment  from Canac, and Canac no longer made statutory deductions or remittances on behalf of them.  The Keenans commenced making their own remittances to the CRA and were responsible to do so for their own employees.  Notwithstanding these changes, the Keenans continued to qualify for Canac employee discounts, wear Canac uniforms, and be provided with Canac business cards.  In addition, Canac gave Mr Keenan a special ring in 1996 in recognition of 20 years of service to the company.

Until 2007, the Keenans worked exclusively for Canac.  Thr0ughout 2006, however, business at Canac went into decline and in order to maintain their income, the Keenans commenced working part of their time at another company.  Canac was aware of this and the bulk of the Keenans’ revenue continued to be generated through Canac.

In 2009, Canac decided to shut down operations for business reasons.  It did not provide the Keenans any notice, pay in lieu of notice, or severance.  It did not provide the Keenans with any the minimum statutory notice prescribed by legislation.  Canac’s position was that the Keenans were independent contractors.

At trial, and on appeal, Canac argued that since the Keenans were not working exclusively for Canac at the time of the termination of their contracts, there was no element of exclusivity at that point and they were not, therefore, dependent contractors.  As independent contractors, Canac believed the Keenans were not entitled to notice or pay in  lieu of notice.  The trial judge rejected this argument on the basis the Keenans continued to be either exclusive, or “near exclusive” contractors to Canac up until the time of their dismissal.  While it might have been true technically, that the Keenans were contracting to two companies at the time of their termination from Canac,  there continued to be a substantial long-term economic dependency on Canac.

The court of appeal upheld the trial judges decision, adding that the question of exclusivity cannot be answered by looking what at might be happening at a given point in time, as Canac was attempting to do.  It was necessary to look at the entire term of the relationship.  In the last two years of their relationship to Canac, the Keenans did a modest amount of work for a competitor of Canac. Canac knew and chose to disregard this knowing the reason was the decline in Canac’s business.  When the appeal court looked at the whole term of the relationship between Canac and the Keenans, it concluded that the minor aberration 0f the last two years could not disturb the fact they were economically dependent on Canac throughout their relationship with the company, including the last two years.  This economic dependency, born of exclusivity, is the hallmark of the dependent contractor relationship.

Canac also appealed the trial court’s award of 26 months of notice for both Mr. and Mrs Keenan.  In its appeal, the company relied on an earlier Ontario Court of Appeal case that established a maximum notice period of 24 months, which could only be exceeded on a finding of exceptional circumstances.  There was no finding made by the trial judge in Keenan of the exceptional circumstances which would justify a notice award exceeding 24 months, though there was evidence that a 26 month notice period had been discussed.

Using the Bardal factors (the Bardal factors have been discussed in an earlier post), the Court of appeal chose to uphold the trial court’s award of 26 month’s notice for each of the Keenans.  In arriving at this decision, the Court of Appeal had regard to the length of service of the Keenans, their respective ages at the time of termination, the supervisory nature of their positions, the fact they were the public face of Canac for the best part of a generation, the degree of dependency they had on Canac and the difficult they would likely encounter in replacing their income with alternative employment.

The important takeaways from the Keenan case include the court’s emphasis on having to look at the entirety of the relationship in assessing whether there is the kind of exclusivity and economic dependence required to establish a relationship of dependent contractor.  Exclusivity does not have to be absolute where economic dependency clearly continues to exist.  The second takeaway is that the determination of reasonable notice for terminating a dependent contractor relationship is the same as that for an employee.  Most importantly, there is no hard and fast limit in determining the maximum length of notice that may be awarded.  The court will continue to have regard to the facts and circumstances of each individual case and making this determination.

 

 

Employee? Independent Contractor? Something in between? What’s the differance and does it matter?

McKee v. Reid’s Heritage Homes Ltd., 2009 ONCA 916 (CanLII)

Aandrew-montgomery-lgre you an employee, an independent contractor or possibly something in between the two? The answer is not merely academic. It can have important and perhaps even unanticipated implications.  To make things just a little more complicating, the answer to the question is not so much found in the wording used in a contract to describe the relationship,  it is more in the character and in the nature of the relationship.  In other words, just because a written document may refer to an individual as an employee, or as an independent contractor, or something else, the words themselves do not necessarily make the individual one or the other.  The presence or absence of certain salient characteristics in the relationship must be examined in order to determine whether the relationship is one of employment or that of an independent contractor.

The court in McKee cited a test referred to as the Sagaz/Belton analysis that is used to determine whether a relationship is one of employment or that of an independent contractor.  The Supreme Court of Canada stated the test in its decision in 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983, 2001 SCC 59:

“The central question is whether the person who has been engaged to perform the services is performing them as a person in business on his own account.  In making the determination, the level of control the employer has over the worker’s activities will always be a factor. However, other factors to consider include whether the worker provides his or her own equipment, whether the worker hires his or her own helpers, the degree of financial risk taken by the worker, the degree of responsibility for investment and management held by the worker, and the worker’s opportunity for profit in the performance of his or her tasks.”

The Ontario Court of Appeal re-stated the Sagaz test in Belton v. Liberty Insurance Co of Canada, 2004 CanLII 6668 (ON CA) in the following five principles:

  1. Whether or not the agent was limited exclusively to the service of the principal;
  2. Whether or not the agent is subject to the control of the principal, not only as to the product sold, but also as to when, where and how it is sold;
  3. Whether or not the agent has an investment or interest in what are characterized as the “tools” relating to his services;
  4. Whether or not the agent has undertaken any risk in the business sense or, alternatively, has any expectation of profit associated with the delivery of his service as distinct from a fixed commission;
  5. Whether or not the activity of the agent is part of the business organization of the principal for which he works.  In other words, whose business is it?”

As stated at the outset, the result of the application of the Sagaz/Belton test is not merely academic.  Numerous practical implications follow from the determination that a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.  What follows here is neither an exhaustive list of the implications, nor an in depth discussion of any one of them.  Included in the list of implications, however, are the following examples:

Statutory Remittances

Employers must deduct and remit on behalf of each of their employees, Income Tax, Employment Insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions.  Independent contractors make all of their own statutory remittances but, when it comes to Income Tax, they have the advantage of deducting all reasonable business expenses against income earned.  Subject to certain legal differences and procedures associated with different types of business entities, this advantage will apply whether the independent contractor is a sole proprietorship, partnership or corporation.

Pension Plan

Where made available, employees often pay into a pension plan with their employer and the employer will make contributions to the plan on behalf of each employee.  Independent contractors will not have this advantage, though they may create such a scheme for their own employees.

Compensation

Employees are generally paid a wage or salary.  They generally do not share in the financial risk with the employer and, consequently, have no expectation of sharing in the profits of the business.  Independent contractors  bear the financial risk of the  their business and, consequently, share in the profits of the business.  Depending on how they are organized legally as a business, they might take the profit in the form of a salary , dividends or some combination of the two.  They might also have the option of leaving some of the profit in the corporation, as an investment in the business.

Federal and/or Provincial legislation

Certain Federal and/or Provincial labour statues and workplace safety statutes which provide safeguards for employees will not have any application to independent contractors.

Entitlement to Reasonable Notice or Pay in Lieu

Barring just cause for dismissal, employees have both a statutory right and common law right to reasonable notice of dismissal or pay in lieu thereof.   Independent contractors have no entitlement to reasonable notice or pay  in lieu thereof.

Many more differences could be listed and much more could be said about the examples cited above.  One other very important legal distinction that McKee does remind us of, however, is that the courts have long recognized a special type of business relationship that falls somewhere in between that of the employee and that of the independent contractor.  It is the relationship of the “dependent contractor“.

In the case of a “dependent contractor” there is still no employer/employee relationship but, because of certain peculiar characteristics of the business relationship, the courts have been prepared to imply that reasonable notice of termination is a legally binding term of the agreement creating the relationship.  A dependent contractor relationship arises where there is a certain exclusivity and permanence of service being provided by a contractor that makes the contractor economically dependent on the business entity being served in the relationship.  For example, the courts have recognized a relationship of dependent contractor where self employed truckers have exclusive long term contracts with a mining company.  A dependent contractor relationship has also been found where self employed individuals act as exclusive distributors for a paper company.  The important thing to remember here is that where the relationship of dependent contractor is established, the contractor may well be entitled to reasonable notice of termination of the contract because of the economic dependency that often ensues with such a relationship.

Finally, to come full circle, a dependent contractor relationship, cannot be avoided simply by calling the business relationship in the wording of the contract that of an independent contractor.  It is the nature of the relationship that is all important.

If you are working as a self employed individual and providing services exclusively and  over the long term to one client, you may well be a dependent contractor and entitled to reasonable notice in the event of termination of your contract.  As always, if you have concerns about your specific circumstances, you should speak to a lawyer.

 

 

Coles Notes of Employment Law in Canada: Performance Related Dismissals

Kurtz v Carquest Canada Ltd., 2015 ONSC 7997 (CanLII)

Kurtz v Carquest Canada Ltd. (“Kurtz“), a recent decision of the Ontario Supreme Court, provides one of the clearest statements of the law and the correct procedure in Canada when it comes to terminating an employee for poor performance.  Does the employer have cause?  How is cause determined?  If the employer does not have cause, what constitutes reasonable notice and how should it be determined?  Over and above the appropriate length of reasonable notice, what damages suffered by the employee should be compensated?

Kurtz commenced his employment with Carquest in 2005 at a Carquest distribution centre in Sacramento California.  By 2009, he had been promoted into the position of Director of Operations.  In January of that year, Kurtz was told the Sacramento distribution centre was to be closed.  Carquest offered Kurtz alternative employment as Director of Operations at an Ontario distribution centre. Kurtz accepted the position and commenced work in Ontario in May of 2009.  All of his relocation expenses were paid by Carquest.

After serving 2 years in Ontario, Carquest determined Kurtz was not performing up to its standards and he was immediately terminated.  His total tenure at Carquest, in California and Ontario, amounted to 5.5 years.

The issues addressed by the court were; first, did Carquest have legal cause to terminate Kurtz and secondly, if Carquest did not have legal cause, what  employee’s damages?

With respect to the first issue, the court laid out the test for determining whether  an employer has established legal cause for termination.  After reviewing the general common law rights and obligations of employers and employees when it comes to termination of the employment relationship, the court went on to list six criteria the employer must satisfy in order to establish legal cause for termination:

  1. Has the employer established reasonable objective standards of performance?
  2. Have those standards been communicated to the employee?
  3. Has the employee been given suitable instruction such that those standards can be met?
  4. Has the employee failed to meet those standards?
  5. Has the employee been warned of the substandard performance and that termination will be the consequence if the substandard performance continues?
  6. Was the employee given a reasonable amount of time to correct the substandard performance?

The burden of proving legal cause for termination rests on the employer.  The test is often difficult to meet and in the absence of documentary evidence, can become extremely difficult to meet.  The employer must satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that it has fulfilled each of the six criteria.  Failure on the part of the employer to satisfy the court it has fulfilled any one criterion out of the six means the employer has failed to discharge its burden of proving legal cause.  The result is, the employee will be found to have been wrongfully dismissed and the employee will be entitled to damages.

In Kurtz, the court found that Carquest met the burden of proof on the first four criteria, but that it failed on the 5th criterion and the 6th criterion.  Kurtz was found to have been wrongfully dismissed and the court turned its focus to assessing the resulting damages

With respect to the damages suffered by Kurtz, the court laid out the key questions to be answered.

  • What was the proper period of reasonable notice?
  • What is the appropriate amount of compensation during the notice period?
  • Was Kurtz entitled to relocation back to California at Carquest’s expense?
  • Was Kurtz entitled to post-termination accounting costs and tax reimbursement?
  • Is vacation pay owing to Kurtz?
  • Did Kurtz reasonably mitigate his damages?
  • Did Carquest’s conduct justify an award of moral damages?
  • Did Carquest’s conduct justify an award of punitive damages?

What was the proper period of reasonable notice?

In answering this question, the court turned to a review of the standard factors generally considered in determining reasonable notice.  These include, amongst others depending on the facts of the case, the age of the employee, the nature of the work performed, the length of service, the likelihood of finding suitable replacement employment.  Kurtz wanted 16 months.  Carquest was offering between 5 and 8 months.  The court emphasized the need to arrive at a length of notice that is “fair” for both parties. On the basis that Kurtz was a senior management employee and that it was likely he would have to relocate back to the United States to find suitable replacement employment, the court determined he required a lengthier notice period than what otherwise might have been appropriate.  Kurtz was awarded an 8 month notice period.

What is the appropriate amount of compensation during the notice period?

The various heads of damage used by the court to calculate the appropriate amount of compensation included:

  1. Eight months base pay;
  2. Out of pocket expenses for health care. The court determined that Kurtz’s actual health costs were a more accurate measure of his damages than the cost of continuing coverage during the notice period;
  3. The cash equivalent of 8 months personal use of the company car;
  4. The court determined Kurtz was not eligible for either the performance bonus plan or the stock options plan;
  5. Reimbursement of additional taxes owing from 2009, the year of Kurtz’s move to Canada.

Was Kurtz entitled to relocation back to California at Carquest’s expense?

Kurtz claimed relocation costs under Carquest’s International Expatriate Policy.  In addition, because he had to leave 4 months early before the expiry of his lease in Ontario, he claimed 4 months rent.  He also claimed for certain household goods that had to be left behind in Ontario since they would not fit in the moving truck.

The court determined that the International Expatriate Policy only applied to employees in a continuing relationship with Carquest and not to employees after they had been terminated.  Kurtz was not entitled, therefore, to recover any costs of relocation back to the United States.

 

Was Kurtz entitled to post-termination accounting costs and tax reimbursement?

When Kurtz originally moved from California to Ontario in 2009 he claimed the costs of the move on his 2009 income tax return.  He was later audited and the moving costs deduction was disallowed.  Carquest was ordered to pay the resulting tax owing.

 

Is vacation pay owing to Mr. Kurtz?

Kurtz was paid out for the two days he had remaining from his vacation entitlement in 2010.

Did Kurtz reasonably mitigate his damages?

An employee who is wrongfully dismissed is legally bound to make every reasonable effort to find suitable replacement employment in order to minimize his or her damages.  Failure to discharge this obligation can lead to a reduction in the length of the notice period.  It is the employer’s burden to prove the employee has failed in the discharge of this obligation.

Kurtz had made some effort to find employment both in Ontario and back in California.  He refused to consider several specific locations in the United States because of family concerns.  The court found that Carquest did not prove on a balance of probabilities that Kurtz failed to mitigate his losses.

Did Carquest’s conduct justify an award of moral damages?

Awards of moral damages in wrongful dismissal cases require medical evidence supporting mental distress arising from the behaviour of the employer in dismissing the employee.  The mental stress must be something more than the expected stress that would normally be experienced when being terminated from employment. In addition to the fact that Kurtz failed to introduce any medical evidence, the court determined there was nothing in the evidence to prove that the methods used by Carquest in the termination justified any moral damages award.  In the termination of Kurtz, Carquest did not act callously, or in bad faith, or in any other manner perceived by the court to be egregious.

 

Did Carquest’s conduct justify an award of punitive damages?

Punitive damages are a discretionary costs award designed to punish a wrongdoer for the egregious way they treated the other party and, or for the egregious way they conducted themselves in the court.  They are rarely awarded.  The court determined in this case that there was not anything in the employer’s behaviour that even remotely justified an award of punitive damages.

NOTE: The value in the decision in Kurtz v. Carquest is not so much in the facts of the case as it is in the procedure articulated by the court for determining when an employee has been wrongfully dismissed and what the quantum of damages should be.

 

Impact of employer’s financial circumstances on length of notice.

andrew-montgomery-lgMichela v. St. Thomas Villanova Catholic School, 2015 ONCA 801 Date: 20151123 Docket: C59979

Michela is a recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision dealing with the question of whether an employer’s financial circumstances are to be taken into account in determining the reasonable length of notice for the termination of an employee without cause?

The three employees who had been terminated by St. Thomas Villanova Catholic School had been employed with the School for thirteen, eleven and eight years respectively.  Domenica Michela, the eleven year employee, argued at trial that his reasonable notice period should be twelve months.  The trial judge reduced the notice period to six months specifically referencing the financial position of the School.  He stated: “I find that the notice period proposed is too long.  I point out that, if notice for 12 months is reasonable, the School will have to pay the same amount for these teachers as if they had remained on staff for the year that was upcoming.  Assuming that the other two teachers who were terminated maintained the same rights, it is not difficult to see that the School would be unable to reduce its prospective deficit by terminating staff it did not need. The law does not ignore the dilemma of the employer. The teachers should be taken to understand this aspect of their employment and, in this case, were made aware of the concern.  In this situation, I reduce the claim for notice by half, to six months.” [emphasis added]

The most fundamental question on appeal in Michela was whether an employer’s financial circumstances are relevant to determining the length of reasonable notice in the context of a termination without cause.  The Court of Appeal began its analysis stating that the nature and purpose of notice are well established.  It then stated the following legal principle: “….employment contracts for an indefinite period require the employer, absent express contractual language to the contrary, to give reasonable notice of an intention to terminate the contract if the dismissal is without cause.”  The Court went on to state that reasonable notice is intended to provide the terminated employee the necessary time to find replacement employment and that: “The calculation of the notice period is a fact specific exercise.”  The Court then outlined the well known Bardal factors (first stated in Bardal v. The Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960) 24 D.L.R.(2d) 140 (Ont.H.C.)) that are to be considered in determining reasonable length of notice including: the circumstances of the employee, the character of the employment, their length of service, their age, the availability of similar employment, their experience, training and qualifications.

The Court emphasized that the Bardal factors are concerned with the circumstances of the wrongfully dismissed employee and not with the circumstances of the employer.  While an employer in Canada generally has the right to terminate an employment relationship for financial reasons, those same financial reasons have no relevance in determining the length of the notice period for the dismissed employee.  An employer cannot use its financial circumstances to justify a reduction in the length of the notice period.  The Court of Appeal increased Michela’s notice period to twelve months.

Has the contract with my employee been frustrated?

Frustration, as that expression is meant to be used in the context of the employment andrew-montgomery-lgrelationship, is a cause for termination that doesn’t often arise, but is frequently misunderstood.  As a legal concept, it is the contract of employment that is said to be frustrated and not the parties themselves. As early as 1956, the British House of Lords’ defined the legal principle of frustration as occurring “whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract“.  In the context of the employment relationship, frustration generally arises in the form of some type of protracted, long term illness affecting the employee.  The employment contract is said to be frustrated because the nature of the employee’s illness has made the contract impossible to perform.

While the principle seems easy of enough to articulate, the difficulty is most often found in its application.  When and how does an employer make the determination that a contract of employment has been frustrated?  Not surprisingly, at the heart of these questions is the wording of the contract. For example, is the contract worded in such a way that it could survive the change in circumstances which is claimed to be frustrating the contract?

The Ontario Supreme Court stated, in 1999: “Whether a contract of employment has been frustrated by an employee’s illness or incapacity depends on whether or not the illness or incapacity was of such an nature or likely to continue for such a period of time that either the employee would never be able to perform the duties contemplated by the original employment contract, or that it would be unreasonable for the employer to wait any longer for the employee to recover.  To determine if a contract has been frustrated, regard must be had to the relationship of the term of the incapacity or absence from work to the duration of the contract, and to the nature of the services to be performed.”

Put more simply, the answer to the question of when an employer will be able to determine an employment contract to be frustrated, will vary with the facts of each individual case.  For example, courts will generally consider the length of absence of an entry level line worker,that is required to support a finding of frustration, to be substantially longer than that for a senior manager upon whom the survival of a business may depend.  In the former case, several years or more may be required.  In the latter, six months might be considered sufficient, depending on all of the facts and circumstances.

One thing employers should be clear about, however, is that frustration does not constitute “cause” or “just cause” for termination.  Frustration does not assign blame or fault to either the employer or the employee.  Consequently, upon the determination that a contract of employment has been frustrated, the employee being terminated is entitled to all appropriate severance and/or notice provisions.

It is always safer and more cost effective to consult legal counsel in advance if you are considering terminating a contract of employment for frustration.

NOTE: adapted from Peter Neumann and Jeffrey Sack, eText on Wrongful Dismissal and Employment Law, 1st ed, Lancaster House, Updated: 2015-03-30 (CanLII), <http://canlii.org/en/commentary/wrongfuldismissal/&gt;.